Karim Faruq v. Mary McCollum by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-18-2013 
Karim Faruq v. Mary McCollum 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"Karim Faruq v. Mary McCollum" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 70. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/70 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
BLD-005       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3229 
___________ 
 
KARIM FARUQ, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MARY MCCOLLUM, Case Manager, F.C.I. Fort Dix; 
 D. SCHAAFF, Unit Manager, F.C.I. Fort Dix 
ROBERT DONAHUE, CMC, F.C.I. Fort Dix 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 1:11-cv-05987) 
District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect or  
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 10, 2013 
Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 18, 2013 ) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Karim Faruq appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his 
complaint.  For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm.  
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I. 
 Faruq, a federal prisoner, filed a complaint pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), against Mary 
McCollum, a case manager at the prison; David Schaaff, a unit manager at the prison; 
and Robert Donahue, the prison’s case manager coordinator.  According to Faruq, he 
submitted transfer requests to the defendants in December 2009 under BOP Program 
Statement 5100.08 and 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), when he realized that he had become 
eligible for transfer to a minimum security facility.  At the time, his custody classification 
was moderate severity.  In response, Defendant Schaaff allegedly instructed Defendant 
McCollum to process the transfer.  Several months later Defendant McCollum reviewed 
Faruq’s file, including prior custody classification reviews, to determine his 
appropriateness for transfer and allegedly questioned him about his reasons for 
complaining to her superiors.  Thereafter, Defendant McCollum raised Faruq’s custody 
classification from moderate severity to the greatest severity and, as a result, prevented 
him from transferring to a minimum security camp.  Faruq challenged the increase, 
explaining to the defendants, to no avail, that he was merely a “wholesaler,” not an 
organizer or leader in the drug organization, and thus did not qualify for the increased 
custody classification.  Faruq claimed that Defendant McCollum’s actions amounted to 
discrimination on the basis of race and religion.  He alleged further that after he informed 
Defendants Schaaff and Donahue of his intent to file a grievance and wrote to his U.S. 
Senator and congressional representative, the defendants retaliated against him.    
3 
 
 The District Court screened Faruq’s original and amended complaint pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2), and dismissed both without prejudice for failure to 
state a viable equal protection and retaliation claim.  Thereafter,  Faruq filed a motion to 
reopen the case and to file a second amended complaint, this time naming two other 
inmates who allegedly were similarly situated to him but received more favorable 
treatment.  In particular, he claimed that the defendants transferred one inmate—
Winestock—to a minimum security camp despite the fact that he had been convicted for 
possessing significantly more drugs than Faruq and had received a sentence enhancement 
for his leadership role in a drug organization.  Faruq claimed the defendants did the same 
with another inmate—McKubbin—who, having arrived at Fort Dix with the greatest 
severity custody classification for his role as a organizer/leader in a drug organization, 
was ultimately deemed a “supervisor” instead of an organizer/leader.  The District Court 
granted Faruq’s motion to reopen but dismissed his second amended complaint without 
prejudice because he failed to allege that his custody level was increased for any reason 
other than his criminal history, that he was similarly situated to the other inmates, and 
that the other inmates received more favorable treatment.  This timely appeal followed.  
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
1
 and we exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s order dismissing Faruq’s complaint.  See Gelman v. State Farm 
                                              
1
 Generally, an order dismissing a complaint without prejudice is not final within the 
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 unless the litigant cannot cure the defect or intends to stand 
on the complaint.  See Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976) 
(per curiam).  Here, the District Court did indeed dismiss the complaint without  
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Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2009).  To survive dismissal, the 
complaint needed to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 
to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  We may summarily 
affirm if the appeal does not present a substantial question, see I.O.P. 10.6; see also 
Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).  
 In dismissing Faruq’s second amended complaint, the District Court took judicial 
notice of his earlier habeas action,
2
 incorporating the record from it for the purpose of 
reviewing the claims raised here,
3
 and concluded that Faruq failed to allege that his 
increased custody classification was the result of either an equal protection violation or 
retaliation.  For substantially the reasons given, we agree with this conclusion.   
 To state a claim for race- or religion-based discrimination, Faruq needed to show 
specifically that he received different treatment from that received by other similarly 
                                                                                                                                                  
prejudice, but it did not expressly grant leave to amend.  Instead, unlike its October 18, 
2012 order dismissing Faruq’s original and amended complaint, the District Court 
ordered the clerk to close the case.  See Garber v. Lego, et al., 11 F.3d 1197, 1198 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 1993).  Nothing in the District Court’s opinion or order anticipates the continuation 
of the action further, and Faruq appealed rather than seeking to amend yet again.  
Accordingly, we deem the District Court order final and appealable.    
2
 Faruq challenged the BOP’s denial of his transfer request, arguing for a lower custody 
classification.  The District Court dismissed the petition, though, for lack of jurisdiction.  
See Faruq v. Zickefoose, No. 10-cv-6768, 2011 WL 4625358 (D.N.J. Oct. 3, 2011).          
3
 Although District Courts are generally limited to considering only the allegations in the 
complaint at the dismissal stage, the District Court here was permitted to consider the 
record from Faruq’s earlier habeas case.  See City of Pittsburgh v. West Penn Power Co., 
147 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 1998) (explaining the public-records exception to the general 
rule of conversion).     
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situated inmates.  See Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2003).  In his 
second amended complaint, Faruq pointed to inmates Winestock and McKubbin who he 
alleged were similarly situated but received lower custody classification for camp 
placement.  As Faruq admitted, though, Winestock was not similarly situated.  
Winestock’s custody classification was lowered from greatest severity to moderate at the 
same time that Faruq’s was lowered, but, unlike Faruq, Winestock’s classification was 
never again raised.  (See Pl.’s Second Am. Compl., at 6; Br. in Supp. of Appeal, at 2.)  
Winestock was therefore eligible for a transfer.  Besides, as Faruq also admitted, 
Winestock is not in a minimum security camp.  (See Pl.’s Second Am. Compl., at 6.)  
And McKubbin was not treated more favorably than Faruq; like Faruq, McKubbin’s 
custody classification was increased to greatest severity and he was ultimately denied 
camp placement.  (See id. Ex. 1.)    
 At bottom, Faruq failed to allege that the defendants acted with discriminatory 
intent or purpose.  See City of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio v. Buckeye Community Hope 
Foundation, 538 U.S. 188, 194-95 (2003).  Although Faruq claimed that his race and 
religion were the reasons that Defendant McCollum increased his custody classification 
from moderate severity to the greatest severity, he conceded that the defendants had a 
rational reason for it; his custody classification was increased because of his purported 
role as a leader and organizer of a drug organization, which, in accordance with the 
BOP’s Program Statement 5100.08, negated a lower custody classification.  (See Pl.’s 
Second Am. Compl. Ex. 3.); see also Ramsgate Court Townhome Ass’n v. West Chester 
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Borough, 313 F.3d 157, 160 (3d Cir. 2002) (requiring a plaintiff to negate every 
conceivable rational basis for his differential treatment).  
 For the reasons discussed above, Faruq also failed to allege that the defendants 
increased his custody classification in retaliation for filing grievances requesting a 
transfer and sending letters to his senator and congressional representative.  In particular, 
he failed to allege a causal link between his complaints and the defendants’ actions.  See 
Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (“A prisoner alleging retaliation must 
show that (1) constitutionally protected conduct, (2) an adverse action by prison officials 
sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights, 
and (3) a causal link between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse 
action taken against him.”).  Foremost, as the District Court explained in dismissing the 
original and first amended complaint, Faruq’s custody classification was increased before 
he ever filed his administrative remedy and contacted his representatives.  Moreover, as 
noted above, the increase resulted from Defendant McCollum’s review of Faruq’s file to 
determine the appropriateness of a transfer—the transfer that Faruq had requested.              
 For the reasons given, the District Court properly dismissed Faruq’s second 
amended complaint.  Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also 3d 
Cir. L.A.R.; I.O.P. 10.6.    
 
